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Abstract 
During the years 1989-1996 the European Commission took a leading role in sequencing the 
yeast genome. The project was completed in April 1996 and celebrated as the success of a 
European research strategy based on a distributed model of scientific collaboration. Almost one 
hundred laboratories and private companies dispersed all over Europe took part in the 
sequencing work sponsored by the European Commission and an industrial platform was 
created to facilitate the exploitation of the genomic data by companies which were interested in 
yeast. The yeast genome project was part of the biotechnology strategy developed by the 
European Commission during the 1980s and 1990s. The Commission expected biotechnology to 
be relevant in crucial areas of political, economic and social intervention and wanted to promote 
economic growth and contribute to the process of European integration by developing a 
community strategy in biotechnology. Due to the strong industrial value of yeast, which is used 
by agrofood, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, sequencing the genome of this 
microorganism proved an ideal opportunity to pursue the Commission’s plans and the paper will 
examine how the yeast genome project was shaped to build human and industrial capacity in 
European biotechnology. By investigating capacity building, it will be possible to understand why 
the European Commission decided to sponsor and coordinate a scientific project in genomics, 
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but with the real aim to strengthen economic growth in the biotechnology sector and promote 
integration among new and old member states of the European Economic Community. 
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1. Introduction 
The first complete description of a eukaryotic genome, the yeast genome, is nowadays a 
‘classic’ result of a [European] Community’s programme. We are rather proud of it. […] In 
its field, the yeast genome project represented a new way to do research. […] The 
Europeans proved able to work together not only when they had to build a machine too 
expensive for the individual countries, but also when it was necessary to reach a critical 
threshold of human capacity distributed among several laboratories.1 
With these words, Paolo Fasella, head of the European Commission’s Directorate for Science, 
Research and Development for almost fifteen years, commented the collaborative project to 
sequence the yeast genome promoted by the European Commission (EC).2 Dozens of European 
laboratories and several biotechnology companies based in Europe joined the project that started 
in 1989 and contributed to sequence over half of the yeast genome. The remaining sequencing 
work was undertaken by the Wellcome Trust Sanger Centre (UK), Washington University St. 
Louis (US), Stanford University (US), McGill University (Canada) and RIKEN (Japan) (Goffeau 
and Vassarotti 1993, p. 35 Table 2) (Fig. 1). The EC was the main project sponsor and also acted 
as global coordinator of the international network that took part in mapping and sequencing the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Interview with Paolo Fasella (1998), pp. 24-26. Voices on Europe Collection (INT585), Historical Archives of the 
European Union (http://archives.eui.eu/en/oral_history/INT585). My translation. 
2 Fasella (1930-1999) was a physician by training and a research biochemist by profession. He managed the 
directorate for Science, Research and Development from 1981 until 1995. 
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yeast genome. 
When the complete sequence was unveiled in April 1996, it was celebrated as the success 
of a European research strategy based on a distributed model of scientific collaboration (Millet 
1996). Almost one hundred laboratories and private companies dispersed all over Europe took 
part in the project (Goffeau et al. 1996, p. 567). They were based in founding member states of 
the European (Economic) Community (EEC), such as France and Germany, but also in 
countries which had only recently joined the EEC, like Spain and Portugal.3 The microbiologist 
André Goffeau coordinated the project.4  He was both a scientist based at the Université 
Catholique de Louvain (UCL) in Belgium and a civil servant working for the EC in DG XII, the 
Directorate for Science, Research and Development headed by Fasella. Goffeau managed the 
project with the support of Alessio Vassarotti, an EC’s civil servant in charge of biotechnology 
projects and a former student of Goffeau (Goujon 2001, p. 556). 
For the EC and its civil servants the yeast genome project was much more than an 
initiative to take part in the race to map and sequence the genome of model organisms and the 
human genome (Cook-Deegan 1996, Fortun 1999). Unlike other popular model organisms, such 
as Drosophila melanogaster and C. elegans, yeast had a strong industrial value, as it was used by the 
food industry, the fermentation industry, the biotechnology industry and the pharmaceutical 
industry. It was therefore “appropriate to finance the sequencing of its genome in the context of 
the [European] community programmes in biotechnology” (Goffeau and Vassarotti 1993, p. 37, 
my translation), whose implicit focus was on industry (Senker 1998, p. 2). The main EC 
biotechnology initiatives of the time that sponsored the yeast genome project were the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The European Economic Community was absorbed into the European Union (EU) with the Lisbon Treaty signed 
in 2009. The denomination European Union began to be used in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. 
4 Goffeau acted also as global coordinator of the project and liaised with the institutions not sponsored by the EC 
that participated in sequencing the yeast genome. A table with the worldwide contributions to the yeast genome 
project is published in Levy (1994, p. 1699). 
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Biotechnology Action Programme (BAP), the Biotechnology Research, Innovation, 
Development and Growth in Europe Programme (BRIDGE) and the programmes BIOTECH I 
and II (Table 1). To promote the transition from research to commercial applications the EC 
also facilitated the creation of industrial platforms in its biotechnology programmes (Aguilar et 
al. 1998). The first one was the Yeast Industry Platform (YIP), which was created in 1990 by 
companies sympathetic to the yeast genome project. YIP members had privileged access to the 
genomic data collected by the laboratories sponsored by the EC and were encouraged to contact 
the sequencing contractors if interested in the industrial exploitation of the genomic data 
(Goffeau and Vassarotti 1993, p. 38). 
The idea that the yeast genome project must be framed within the biotechnology 
programmes implemented by the EC during the 1980s and 1990s, and more generally within the 
biotechnology policy developed in those years, is not new. Philippe Goujon already established 
such connection in his book From Biotechnology to Genomes (Goujon 2001). Unlike Goujon’s book, 
however, the aim of this paper is not “to write the ‘little tale’ of the European and world effort 
to sequence the yeast genome” (Goujon 2001, p. xvi). Neither this paper aims to address specific 
aspects of the yeast genome project, such as its collaborative model (Joly and Mangematin 1997a, 
1998), the management of intellectual property rights (Joly and Mangematin 1997a) or the data 
access policy (Hilgartner 1998; 2017, pp. 171-172).5 Instead, this paper will examine how the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The historiography on the yeast genome project is not extensive. Apart from the contributions mentioned above 
(Goujon 2001; Hilgartner 1998, 2017; Joly and Mangematin 1997a, 1997b, 1998), little else – see Cooke-Deegan 
(1996, p. 201) and Langer (2016, pp. 431–434) – has been written on the yeast genome project by historians of 
science and STS scholars. On the contrary, the European scientists and civil servants who took part in the project 
were prolific writers. Their published contributions, alongside reports on the yeast genome project and EC’s policy 
documents are the primary sources on which this paper is based. They are complemented by oral histories and 
archival documents provided by the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), the National Human 
Genome Research Institute Archive (NHGRI), the Carlsberg Archive, the Archive of European Integration (AEI), 
E. J. Louis personal papers. 
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yeast genome project was shaped to build the human capacity in biotechnology mentioned by 
Fasella in the opening quotation and why this human capacity and the associated industrial 
capacity (see, for instance, Senker 1998, p. 160) were part of the EC’s plans for economic 
development and European integration. 
‘Capacity building’ is an actors’ category for the EC’s civil servants and the advisors 
involved in shaping biotechnology policies during the 1980s and 1990s. They repeatedly use the 
term (e.g. Cantley 1983; European Commission 1988; Senker 1998), although they never define it 
explicitly. Reading between the lines of the policy documents, it is evident that the EC’s civil 
servants and policy advisors had in mind a broad strategy of human resources and industrial 
development when they wrote about Europe’s need for “a broadly-based scientific and 
technological capability to respond to the twin needs of increased competitiveness and a better 
quality of life”, when they assessed the necessity of cost-effective solutions for developing such 
capabilities and the relevance of basic research in achieving them, and when they stressed the 
regional differences in R&D capacities across the Community (European Commission 1988, p. 
5; p. 10; p. 60). 
Besides being an actors’ category, capacity building can also act as a useful analytical 
category for the contemporary historian. By using this concept, it is possible to interconnect the 
scientific, economic and political agendas that shaped the yeast genome project and made it an 
experiment in science policy and European integration as much (and probably more) than a 
contribution to genomics. Used as an analytical category, capacity building resonates with the 
namesake concept now widespread in the international aid and development literature, and in 
management and in public policy (Kislov et al. 2014). While it is not the aim of this paper to 
establish and discuss connections between the capacity building model envisaged by EC’s civil 
servants and policy advisors during the 1980s and 1990s and the modern concept of capacity 
building, the EC is certainly recognised as an early proponent of the capacity building concept in 
relation to the economic development of disadvantaged communities (Pence and Benner 2015, 
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pp. 7–8) and European social fund objectives incorporated the notion already in the 1990s 
(Harrow 2001, p. 210).6 Since then the concept has never disappeared from the EC’s policy 
discourse whenever at stake there are research and innovation strategies and their impact on 
social and political development (see, for instance, Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 2014). 
In relation to the yeast genome project, the use of capacity building will allow to 
understand why a political and administrative entity, the EC, decided to sponsor and coordinate 
a scientific project in genomics, but with the real aim to strengthen economic growth in the 
biotechnology sector and promote integration among new and old member states of the EEC. 
When the yeast genome project started at the turn of the 1990s, “[p]olitical orders that seemed to 
be rigidly fixed changed within only a few years” (Bornschier 2000, p. 3). The fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War 
era. At the same time, the European integration process culminated in the Maastricht Treaty and 
the creation of the European Union in 1992. All these events had an immediate effect on the 
yeast genome project sponsored by the EC, because the network of participating laboratories 
constantly expanded from 1989 until the conclusion of the project in 1996. 
By examining the yeast genome project as an opportunity to build human and industrial 
capacities in European biotechnology, the paper will contribute to the growing historiography on 
the role of science and technology in European integration. It will complement the existing 
literature on scientific facilities and organisations in Europe (Guzzetti and Krige 1997; Krige 
1996, 2002, 2014), and add an history of science perspective to the historiography of technology 
that has already addressed how “European integration depended on and was shaped by material 
networks, technical systems, and the circulation of knowledge and artifacts” (Misa and Schot 
2005, p. 2). The paper will also contribute to the current literature on biotechnology in the 
European Union (EU), a literature which is mainly focused on the social conflicts raised by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 More information on the early uses of the term capacity building can be found in Craig (2010). 
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biotechnology and the divisions it produced (e.g. Gottweis 1998; Jasanoff 2005; Montpetit et al. 
2006). Conversely, the case of the yeast genome project emphasises how biotechnology could be 
an opportunity to build political integration and develop policies consistent with European 
values and standards. The yeast genome project will offer a specific example of how 
biotechnology became “an occasion for the formation of European culture in action” (Bud 1994, 
p. 202). 
To provide evidence for my argument, I will examine EC’s biotechnology policies in the 
1980s and 1990s and the role that genomics had in them. I will then describe in detail the 
organisation of the Yeast Genome Sequencing Network and how it was used to build human 
and industrial capacity in European biotechnology. In conclusion, I will discuss how the use of 
capacity building allows to interconnect the scientific, political and business agendas that shaped 
European biotechnology. 
 
Figure 1 
Data source: European Commission 1996, p. 6. There was a total of 377 kbp overlap between 
DNA fragments allocated to EU, UK, USA, Canada and Japan. 
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Table 1: EC Biotechnology Programmes that funded the Yeast Genome Sequencing Project 
Programme name Total budget 
(in million ECU) 
Programme 
duration 
Yeast chromosomes 
mapped/sequenced 
Biotechnology Action Programme 
(BAP) and revision 
75 1985-1990 III 
Biotechnology Research for 
Innovation, Development and 
Growth in Europe (BRIDGE) 
100 1990-1993 II, X, XI 
BIOTECH I 184.14 1992-1996 IV, VII, X, XIV, XV 
BIOTECH II 595.50 1994-1998 IV, VII, XII, XV, XVI 
Data source: Hoeveler and Cresti (1997). The budget figures are extracted from the EU Parliamentary question E-
0206/1998. 
 
 
2. The EC’s strategy in biotechnology during the 1980s and 1990s 
The Community’s research activities in biotechnology have a long history starting from 
radiation biology in EURATOM, arguments in the 1970s about recombinant DNA 
regulation, and the long debate which led in 1981 to adoption of a first and modest (15 
MECU, 1982-86) “Biomolecular Engineering Programme (BEP)”, covering elements of 
genetic engineering and enzymology. (European Commission 1991 Annex II)7 
This is the genealogy of biotechnology research in the EEC, as reconstructed by EC’s civil 
servants in the early 1990s (see also Cantley and de Nettancourt 1992). This genealogy has 
crystallized and it is still adopted in recent accounts of biotechnology written by EC’s civil 
servants (Aguilar et al. 2013). This linear narrative that connects early work in radiation biology 
to biotechnology reflects the career path of many amongst the most influential people involved 
in biotechnology during the 1980s and 1990s. It is certainly the case for Dreux de Nettancourt, 
who advanced “a possible action of the European Communities for the optimal exploitation of 
the fundamentals of the new biology in applied research” in the 1970s and went on to become !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The ECU (European Currency Unit) was used by the EC as an internal accounting unit until 1999, when it was 
officially replaced by the Euro. 
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head of the EC’s biotechnology division during the BEP programme in the early 1980s.8 André 
Goffeau, a close associate of de Nettancourt for many years and the coordinator of the yeast 
genome project, also moved from the radiation protection projects sponsored by the 
Community to work on the EC’s biotechnology programmes (Goujon 2001, p. 94). 
However, this account that connects the EURATOM radiation biology programmes to 
biotechnology fails to explain the revolutionary claims that EC’s policy documents formulated 
about biotechnology in crucial areas of political, economic and social intervention, such as 
chemicals, food, health, energy and the environment (Cantley 1983; European Commission 
1983, 1994). The radiation biology programmes promoted by EURATOM were very limited in 
scope and aimed only at the creation of common standards in European nuclear research and 
protection.9 By contrast, the EC’s vision for biotechnology “expressed a grand design interfacing 
R&D policies, industrial policies, and regulatory politics” (Gottweis 1998, p. 171). To realise this 
“grand design” it was necessary to increase the resources available and the budget of the 
biotechnology programmes rose steeply from the modest BEP budget of 15 million ECU to the 
almost 600 million ECU of BIOTECH II, the biotechnology programme that sponsored the 
final stages of the yeast genome project (see Table 1). 
However, money alone would not have been enough to sustain the EC’s grand design for 
European biotechnology, if this enterprise had not been recast as a “European project” in need 
of a supranational strategy (Gottweis 1998, p. 174). Already in 1983, Mark Cantley, an EC’s civil 
servant who worked for many years on shaping biotechnology policies, stressed the necessity of 
“political confidence in a Community approach, and some de facto sharing of costs, risks, and 
benefits at European scale” (Cantley 1983, p. 65). In this scenario, the objectives of the EC’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Cold Spring Harbour Laboratory Archives Ref. SB/1/2/206/3. 
9 On the EURATOM research programmes see Fasella’s interview (pp. 6-8), Historical Archives of the European 
Union, Ref. INT585. The most ambitious goal of the EURATOM Treaty was the development of a common 
strategy in the industrial exploitation of nuclear energy, a common strategy which never materialised. 
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biotechnology R&D policy had to be “compatible with and supportive of other community 
policies” related to economic growth, industry, education, health, agriculture, development, 
environmental issues, etc. (Cantley 1983, pp. 74–75). The first FAST (Forecasting and 
Assessment in Science and Technology) programme also officially concluded that the 
interdisciplinary nature of biotechnology, the diversity of its applications and its expected 
potential made “valuable to look at the whole biotechnology problem at European level” and the 
analysis required “had to go beyond the scientific and industrial aspects and take account of the 
political and social implications” (European Commission 1983, p. 21). 
Concertation became a major concern within EC’s biotechnology policy “with the 
objectives of improving standards and capabilities in the life sciences, and enhancing the strategic 
effectiveness with which these are applied to the social and economic objectives of the 
Community and its Member States”.10 As argued by Sheila Jasanoff,  
biotechnology policy became a site of interpretive politics, in which important elements of 
European identity were debated along with the goals and strategies of European research. 
[...] to answer what Europe should strive to achieve in the field of biotechnology, it proved 
necessary to address what kind of union Europe was – or wanted to be – both in relation to 
its member states and as a player on the world stage. (Jasanoff 2005, p. 92) 
The EC gained the legislative tools to become a key player in the promotion of biotechnology 
with the enforcement of the Single European Act (SEA) (Cantley 1995, p. 518).11 The SEA 
completed the constitution of the internal market, strengthened political integration and 
expanded community powers in relation to research and development, environmental issues and 
common foreign policy. This treaty marked a qualitative shift in European integration because 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Quotation taken from Cantley (1995, p. 539). In 1984 a secretariat known as Concertation Unit for Biotechnology 
in Europe (CUBE) was created within DG XII redeploying the staff involved in the biotechnology activities of the 
FAST programme. Cantley managed this secretariat until it was dissolved in 1992.  
11 The Single European Act was signed in 1986, but came into effect in July 1987. 
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regulated “policy cooperation at European level” (Bornschier 2000, p. xii). In the case of 
biotechnology it enabled the EC to act as a “political entrepreneur” promoting research 
programmes and the creation of “an industry-friendly legal environment” (Nollert 2000, p. 
243).12 These actions were lobbied for by the transnational European business elite that “were 
pushing to have the same opportunities as their global competitors by broadening their home 
base (allowing for greater economies of scale) and by getting support from strategic technology 
policy” (Bornschier 2000, p. 29). However, if transnational were the business stakeholders and 
national the governments and institutions that took part in and benefitted from the EC’s R&D 
programmes in biotechnology, it was the supranational dimension of the Commission, which 
was influenced but not driven by national ambitions, that made political entrepreneurship 
possible and transformed the yeast genome project in an opportunity to increase human and 
industrial capabilities in European biotechnology. 
However, in Europe biotechnology was not only associated to positive images of 
economic growth, more employment and increased industrial competitiveness. Ethical issues, 
environmental and health risks and unsettling transformations of the labour market were seen as 
potential negative outcomes produced by biotechnology and requiring regulation at national and 
transnational level. The establishment of a regulatory framework for biotechnology (Cantley 
1995) was indeed one of the areas in which the EC became very active during the 1980s and 
1990s, alongside the protection of intellectual property rights associated to biotechnology 
inventions (see Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnology inventions) and the 
monitoring of the public perception of biotechnology, for instance through the Eurobarometer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The EC is both a political and an administrative entity (Christiansen 1997). Its ambiguous role stems from its 
tasks and its organisation. While president, vice-presidents and members of the Commission are politically 
nominated, the thousands of EC’s civil are not, but they all together participate in the highly politicized tasks of the 
Commission which consist in proposing legislation and supervising the implementation of policies and (when 
necessary) their renegotiation at national scale. 
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surveys (Jasanoff 2005, pp. 85–89). 
 In shaping its R&D biotechnology policy, the EC decided to limit its intervention to ‘pre-
competitive’ research. The Community facilitated the creation of links between academic and 
industrial research and stimulated associations among private companies for dealing with 
investigations not directly connected to marketable products. The leap from pre-competitive 
investigations to near-market research was instead left “to the companies themselves so as to 
maintain the incentive for them to compete through innovation” (European Commission 1991, 
p. 15). The EC took also upon itself the tasks “to develop in biotechnology the habit of 
transnational collaboration between [academic] laboratories within Europe” (European 
Commission 1991 Annex 2). A successful initiative in this pursuit was the creation of “open-
ended, transnational association[s] of cooperating European groups with a common 
commitment to target-oriented multidisciplinary research” (van der Meer et al. 1987, p. 318). 
These associations, called European Laboratories Without Walls (ELWWs), were launched in the 
context of the BAP programme and brought together researchers working in industry and 
academia in a free exchange of methods, materials and results (European Commission 1988, p. 
242). The pilot phase of the yeast genome project, the sequencing of chromosome III, was one 
of such ELWWs. The project, sponsored by the Commission with over 2.5 million ECU, was 
able to bring together “most of the best European laboratories working on yeast molecular 
biology” (Vassarotti and Magnien 1990, p. 12) and proved the feasibility of the EC’s network 
approach and its effectiveness in building human capabilities across the EEC. Apart from 
stimulating precompetitive research, the EC also provided training opportunities, especially “in 
Member States which recently joined the Community or where stronger foundations in basic 
biotechnology must be prepared” (European Commission 1991 Annex 3). 
The expected outcome of this strategic investment in biotechnology was to make the 
EEC, as a supranational organisation, competitive with United States and Japan. Hardly any EC’s 
document on biotechnology written during the 1980s and 1990s fails to mention US and 
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Japanese performances in biotechnology and to compare them with the European effort (see, for 
instance, European Commission 1984). Regulatory frameworks, policy attitudes, long and short-
term investment strategies were examined in detail to understand whether there were lessons to 
be learnt and pitfalls to be aware of in the competition with US and Japan. The EC expected 
biotechnology to provide two million jobs by the year 2000 (European Commission 1991, p. 3). 
But worldwide competition was especially tough in biotechnology because multinational 
companies could relocate their R&D activities where they expected to find the best regulatory 
and economic conditions, and knowledge-intensive jobs could shift from one country to 
another. The German chemical industry BASF, for instance, moved its main R&D biotech 
activities to Massachusetts, when Germany adopted EC’s regulations on genetically modified 
organisms that were deemed too restrictive (Mackenzie 1993). The biotechnology strategy that 
the EC promoted in those years, therefore, was shaped by two equally important ambitions. The 
first ambition was to build a transnational biotechnology community in Europe. This community 
involved not only the member states of the EEC, but also COST-participants and EFTA 
countries that took part in the EC’s biotechnology programmes, starting with the BRIDGE 
programme.13 This transnational approach within Europe had to coexist with the EC’s second 
ambition to make European biotechnology a global player, able to both compete and collaborate 
with partners based in US and Japan. To become a global player in biotechnology, Europe 
needed both the human capacity generated by EC’s training opportunities and cooperation 
schemes, such as the ELWWs, and the industrial capacity that clear regulations on biotechnology 
inventions and stronger links between academic laboratories and private companies could 
stimulate. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) is an intergovernamental network for the promotion 
of scientific and technological exchange founded in 1971. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was 
founded in 1960 by Norway and Switzerland. Iceland and Liechtenstein have also joined this association. 
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3. Genomics in EC’s biotechnology 
 Genome mapping and sequencing projects had a role in EC’s biotechnology strategies 
since the 1980s. “The characterization of the structure and expression of microbial, animal and 
plant genomes” was officially presented as a priority area of intervention already in the BEP 
programme (Davignon 1983). Genome analysis remained central to EC’s biotechnology 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Within the BAP, BRIDGE and SCIENCE programmes, 
mapping and sequencing activities on the genomes of model organisms – yeast, Arabidopsis 
thaliana, Bacillus subtilis, Drosophila melanogaster – and on the mouse and porcine genome were 
funded (Vassarotti et al. 1990, p. 87 (Table)). In 1990 also a dedicated programme for the human 
genome, the Human Genome Analysis Programme, was adopted by the EC (Hallen and Klepsch 
1995). These genomic projects facilitated transnational collaboration in Europe and international 
cooperation with the US and Japan at the same time. As mentioned above, the yeast genome 
project involved laboratories based in the EEC, EFTA and COST countries alongside 
institutions in the US, Canada and Japan. The same pattern – with the exclusion of Canadian 
laboratories – was used for the Arabidopsis thaliana project (Delseny et al. 1997). The genome of 
Bacillus subtilis was sequenced by a consortium of European (EEC and EFTA) laboratories in 
association with Japanese laboratories (Kunst et al. 1995). 
Despite the cooperation with US and Japan, however, the EC approach to genome 
analysis of model organisms remained markedly ‘European’. Both the US and Japan invested in 
the development of sequencing technology and in the creation of dedicated centres able to 
undertake large-scale sequencing work. For instance, the RIKEN centre in Tsukuba, Japan, 
which sequenced chromosome VI of the yeast genome, heavily invested in the automation of 
DNA sequencing (Cook-Deegan 1996, p. 217). The same emphasis on technology was placed in 
the US and, with a certain disconcert, a US commentator returning from an EC meeting on 
genomics pointed out that “the Europeans do not appreciate our emphasis on development of 
sequencing technology as a prerequisite for funding of sequencing projects of important model 
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organisms”. While model organisms were part of the Human Genome Project in the US, in 
Europe they were studied for their “economic implications”, as already mentioned for yeast, and 
community-based efforts were deemed compatible with the decision to use state-of-the-art-
methods, and entrust the sequencing laboratories also with the functional analysis.14 
When called to decide whether to invest in new technology or in increased human 
capability, the choice of the EC always favoured the latter against the former during the 1980s-
1990s. This is the reason why the mapping and sequencing projects of model organisms 
sponsored by the EC turned into capacity building exercises in both academia and industry, as I 
argue for the yeast genome project. That is also the reason why these projects could not be 
reproduced later in time, when artisanal skills in sequencing had been completely outdated by the 
factory-style work carried out in dedicated centres. At most, small laboratories could be called 
upon “to sort out problem regions where their specialist knowledge of the organism involved 
may be of assistance” (Goffeau et al. 1996, p. 567). A change in the EC’s biotechnology strategy 
in genomics was therefore required in the second half of the 1990s, but its investigation falls 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the yeast genome project was compatible with the 
EC’s biotechnology programmes because its scientific interest for yeast as model organism went 
hand in hand with the industrial value of yeast. A successful strategy in biotechnology required to 
“establish a much closer and more interactive relationship between fundamental research and 
commercial production” (European Commission 1988, p. 27) and the yeast genome project 
enforced this vision by bringing together academic research and industrial R&D. If the majority 
of the European laboratories that sequenced the yeast genome were based in academic 
institutions, nonetheless private companies were systematically involved in the project either as 
(paid) contributors to the sequencing work or as members of the YIP. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Linda Engels, Report on the Genome Analysis in the EC Meeting, May 1991, National Human Genome Research 
Institute (NHGRI) Archive, file ref. 1219_007. 
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Aside from the industrial implications, the project was considered value for money 
because the yeast genome was compact and with very little non-coding DNA, it acted as a model 
for other eukaryotic genomes, including the human genome, and offered an opportunity to 
identify rapidly the function of unknown genes through targeted disruption. “Translated in plain 
economic terms this signifies that we are dealing with the best ‘scientific output/resources 
invested’ ratio available on the ‘market’”, argued Goffeau and Vassarotti (Goffeau and Vassarotti 
1990, p. 30). The economic evaluation of the project is indicative of the EC’s approach to 
genome analysis and suggestive of how the EC, as a promoter of science and technology, never 
forgot to be first and foremost a political body whose accountability was to multiple 
stakeholders, not to the EEC’s scientific community alone. In this sense, another aspect of the 
project fulfilled the EC’s needs. Sequencing the yeast genome did not pose any ethical concern 
(Vassarotti et al. 1995, p. 131).15 This was crucial in the European context where biotechnology 
remained a contested field of research and social anxieties about biotechnologies were 
considerable and could hinder scientific research and industrial R&D. 
 
4. The Yeast Genome Sequencing Network 
During the years 1989-1996 the EC invested about 20 million ECU in the yeast genome 
sequencing project (European Commission 1996, p. 6).16 The initial funding was provided in the 
context of the BAP programme and sponsored the sequencing of chromosome III (January 
1989–December 1990). The remaining mapping and sequencing activities sponsored by the EC 
were related to chromosomes II, IV, VII, X, XI, XII, XIV, XV, XVI (Fig. 2) and were 
undertaken from 1990 to 1996. The Université Catholique de Louvain, Goffeau’s own !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 At the conclusion of the yeast genome project the civil servants in DG XII re-evaluated the ethical and legal 
implications of the project (DG XII 1996). 
16 EC funding was often integrated by national funding, thus the overall estimation of the money spent on the 
project is difficult (Joly and Mangematin 1998, p. 82). 
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institution, acted as financial and administrative coordinator redistributing the funding provided 
by the EC to the participating laboratories. For each of the chromosomes sequenced (in full or 
in part) with funding provided by the EC there was a designated coordinator (Fig. 2), who was in 
charge of the preparation of a cosmid library and the creation of a physical map of the 
chromosome. 17  The coordinator was also tasked with redistributing to the participating 
laboratories the cosmids to be sequenced, he was in charge of quality control on the submitted 
sequences and had to assemble the final sequence (Joly and Mangematin 1998, p. 79 Figure 5.1). 
The sequencing data produced by the European network were collected, managed and 
preliminarily analysed by a single informatics centre, the Martinsried Institute for Protein 
Sequences (MIPS), based near Munich. The molecular geneticist Piotr Slonimski coordinated the 
functional analysis of the yeast genome.18 
To ensure that the “challenging team-work” was “carried out in a spirit of collaboration, trust and 
openness”, clear rules were set out on the distribution of the cosmids to be sequenced, the payments, the intellectual 
property rights and the validation and sharing of the sequencing data.19 Each participating laboratory (sub-
contractor) was to receive a sequencing unit of fixed length from the chromosome coordinator and had the duty to 
sequence it and carry out basic verification procedures. The sub-contractor’s retribution was proportional to the 
amount of base pairs sequenced and, apart from the first initial payment, all the following payments were subject to 
timely progress in sequencing and adequate quality of the results. For the pilot project all the participating 
laboratories were assigned 8 kb sequencing units and paid 5 ECU/bp (Vassarotti et al. 1990, p. 89). During the 
progress of the sequencing project the length of the sequencing units constantly increased, while the payment 
decreased. For the BIOTECH I programme, for instance, sub-contractors who did ‘small scale sequencing’ were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The genomic libraries used in the pilot project were courtesy of US researchers. Subsequently the European 
researchers took upon themselves the tasks of building appropriate libraries. These libraries circulated among the 
laboratories of the European chromosome coordinators and were also shared with the Canadian laboratory that 
contributed to sequencing the yeast genome (Dujon 1993, p. 359). 
18 For Slonimski’s contribution to the yeast genome functional analysis see Annex 1 of the contract for sequencing 
Yeast Chromosome III (Carlsberg Archive). On Slonimski’s contribution to yeast genetics see Dujon (2009). 
19 Annex 1, Sequencing Yeast Chromosome III (Carlsberg Archive). 
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expected to sequence contiguous fragments of at least 25 kb/year and were paid 2 ECU/bp, as during the BRIDGE 
programme, while the contractors involved in medium scale sequencing were expected to sequence contiguous 
fragments of at least 100 kb and were paid 1.6 ECU/bp. The payment per base pair further decreased in 1996 (1 
ECU/bp) (Vassarotti and Magnien 1996). Provisions were also made for the construction of cloning libraries (0.1 
ECU/bp) and information coordination (0.05 ECU/bp).20 
Each sub-contractor could adopt their preferred sequencing strategy, as long as results were accurate and 
the laboratory met the sequencing targets. Once a sequencing unit had been completed and was submitted to the 
informatics centre, a laboratory could request a new one. Distribution was done “on a first come first serve basis” 
(Vassarotti et al. 1995, p. 133) rewarding the most enterprising subcontractors, but the tapering rates avoided 
excessive concentration of sequencing work in the hands of only a few contractors (Joly and Mangematin 1998). 
Each assigned portion of the sequence became “property” of the sub-contractor for the duration of the sequencing 
programme (Vassarotti et al. 1995, p. 133). Sub-contractors had the opportunity to analyse, publish and even patent 
the DNA segments sequenced.21 The coexistence of genome sequencing and data analysis was possible because the 
network mainly involved contractors that had scientific expertise in yeast genetics rather than “highly specialised [in 
sequencing] scientists and technicians who may never have seen a yeast outside of a bottle of doubly fermented 
beer” (Goffeau et al. 1996, p. 566).22 From 1991, when the first sequences related to chromosome III became 
available, until 1996, when the complete genome sequence was made public, the journal Yeast published 226 papers 
reporting on sequenced yeast genome fragments (Goffeau 1996, p. 1603).23 The journal published both Yeast 
Sequencing Reports for the rapid presentation of sequencing data and Functional Analysis Reports for the systematic 
analysis of the function of novel genes discovered as a result of genome sequencing.24 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 For the payment rates during the BIOTECH programme see Gordon Adam Papers, Historical Archives of the 
European Union, Ref. 33/2/ii. 
21 Contractors had to sign a “Confidential declaration concerning the information and other results, patentable or 
not, arising from a cost-sharing research contract concluded with the Commission of the European Communities” 
(Carlsberg Archive). 
22 All the thirty-five laboratories that took part in the pilot project already had a consolidated expertise in yeast 
genetics. Only later in the project the EC accepted sub-contractors, mainly the biotechnology companies, that did 
not have a specific commitment to yeast research, but could offer increased rates of sequencing work. 
23 A few more reports were published also in 1997. 
24 Yeast, Notes for Contributors. 
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Sequences deposited in the MIPS database, but not immediately published by the sub-contracting 
laboratory, were confidential, although third parties – for instance the other sub-contractors and the companies who 
were members of the YIP – could have a limited and controlled access to them, before they were made available to 
everyone with the publication of the complete chromosome sequence in a open access database (Vassarotti et al. 
1995, p. 134; Joly and Mangematin 1998, pp. 81–82). Before this final publication, the sequence data were checked 
to reduce the error rate, and assembled. Some re-sequencing was also undertaken for verification purposes by the 
participating laboratories, as part of their contractual obligations. The publication of the complete chromosome 
sequence had to follow the conclusion of the data collection process within six months and, at that point, previous 
intellectual property rights were lost and the sequencing laboratories were “liable for free distribution of DNA 
material and other biological materials to third parties” (Vassarotti et al. 1995, p. 136). Yeast geneticists shared a 
deep communitarian ethos, and if the European yeast genome network had to break this tradition to stimulate rapid 
analysis of the genomic data, it had also to reinstate it eventually, as the project itself had benefitted from this ethos 
in the acquisition of the original genomic libraries, donated by the US researchers Maynard Olson, Linda Riles and 
Carol Newlon (Dujon 2015).25 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 During the 1980s, Maynard Olson, based at the University of Washington St Louis, worked on building a 
complete physical map of the yeast genome. By the time the yeast genome project started in 1989, however, Olson 
was moving away from this institution and did not want to be involved in the project (Olson, personal 
communication). Linda Riles, who was Olson right-hand person on the yeast mapping project, took instead part in 
the project, as she continued to work on yeast mapping in the same institution, but in Mark Johnston’s laboratory. 
In the US, Johnston’s laboratory was the centre that did most of the sequencing work for the yeast genome project. 
Carol Newlon worked on mapping yeast chromosome III. She collaborated with the European network in the pilot 
phase of the project and she is listed as one of the co-authors in the publication that presented the complete 
sequence of chromosome III (Oliver et al. 1992).  
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Figure 2 
Data source: European Commission 1996, p. 6. In brackets the name of the chromosome 
coordinator and his affiliation. 
 
5. Building Human Capacity 
The EC’s civil servants who coordinated the yeast genome project, Goffeau and Vassarotti, 
envisaged in the network model several advantages. Some of these advantages were of a general 
scientific nature, for instance the rapid exploitation of the sequencing data made possible by the 
expertise in yeast research of the laboratories involved in the network, or the technological and 
methodological innovations facilitated by the sharing of ideas and experiences among the 
contractors. But there were also advantages that were peculiar to the European situation. The 
network approach, in fact, offered the opportunity of a “parallel gain of expertise and 
information spread over all the European Community” and “facilitated access to European 
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scientific competences” as the European laboratories “recorded their specific competences in 
order to assist each other in specific problems” (Goffeau and Vassarotti 1990, p. 30). 
Indeed, the network participants pursued very different kinds of research. Among the 
participating institutions were laboratories dedicated to basic research in microbiology, genetics, 
biochemistry, molecular biology, but also institutions devoted to agricultural and food research 
(e.g. the French Institut National Agronomique Paris-Grignon or the British Food Research 
Institute in Norwich), biotechnology (for instance, the French company Pharmacia Biotech in 
Orsay), and medicine (e.g. DKFZ, a German centre for cancer research located in Heidelberg). 
This plurality of interests in yeast research did not materialise by chance. The sequencing 
laboratories were not randomly recruited by the chromosome coordinators among their personal 
networks, but they were selected according to the Community’s evaluation procedures among 
the laboratories that had applied “in the frame of a relevant EC research programme” (Vassarotti 
et al. 1995, p. 132). If biotechnology was to answer societal challenges related to agriculture, 
environment, health and energy, as envisioned by the EC’s policymakers, it was certainly 
necessary to grow expertise in both basic and applied research and to distribute it across a variety 
of disciplines, ranging from medicine to enzymology, as in the case of the yeast sequencing 
network. 
Alongside the disciplinary diversity of the yeast genome sub-contractors, their geographic 
distribution also deserves some attention. Except for Luxembourg, all the EEC countries were 
involved in the network with at least one laboratory. Belgium, France and, especially, Germany 
had the lion’s share, but also countries like Spain, which had joined the EEC only in 1986, were 
well represented. In the sequencing work sponsored by the BRIDGE and BIOTECH 
programmes, contractors were also recruited among EFTA and COST-member countries. 
Nations that have never joined the EEC, like Switzerland and Norway, or nations that joined the 
EU much later, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, featured in the yeast genome project. 
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Care was taken to avoid the creation of national subnetworks in the sequencing work, as 
explained by Goffeau to the staff of the Carlsberg Laboratory involved in the project:  
In order to avoid national (or any other) clubs in the “sequencing crews” of the two DNA 
coordinators, we have made arbitrary assignments and will request switching to a clone from 
chromosome II after determination of your first cosmid from chromosome XI.26 
The yeast genome project had to build competencies all over Europe because transnational was 
the biotechnology strategy of the EC. Indeed, the targets of the yeast genome network were 
“happy DNA sequencing” as much as “merry collaboration” among the European countries.27 
As a truly transnational initiative, the yeast genome network satisfied the cooperative 
scheme of the European Laboratories Without Walls envisaged by the EC, but in this case it was 
not just a matter to promote circulation of people or pooling of established knowledge, materials 
and methods. Rather, the yeast genome project was designed to progressively increase 
sequencing competences all over Europe. The number of participating laboratories steadily rose 
in time: thirty-five European contractors took part in the pilot project, thirty-six in the successive 
BRIDGE-funded research, fifty-six in the activities sponsored by the BIOTECH I programme 
and seventy-four in the final sequencing carried out under the BIOTECH II programme 
(Goujon 2001, pp. 461–464). Among these laboratories, a few – for instance, Goffeau’s UCL 
laboratory or the German DKFZ in Heidelberg – became systematically involved in the project 
and had a role in the sequencing of all, or almost all, the chromosomes tackled by the European 
network. Many more institutions, instead, just took part in the sequencing of one or two 
chromosomes and were content with the sequencing skills so learnt. As each contractor could 
choose the preferred sequencing strategy, there was no technological barrier that prevented 
access to the project and even the laboratories that still adopted manual methods had the 
opportunity to join the sequencing network. Indeed most of the contractors in the yeast genome !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Letter from A. Goffeau to D. von Wettstein, 29th November 1990 (Carlsberg Archive). 
27 Ibid. 
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project relied on manual sequencing methods, and only a few, like Fritz Pohl’s laboratory 
(Universität Konstanz) in Germany, systematically invested in the development of new and more 
efficient sequencing technology, even making a family business of it (Oliver 1995). 
However, as financial contributions constantly decreased and were subject to the timely 
completion of the work, the contractors who were associated for longer with the project had 
constantly to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness of their sequencing methods to make the 
venture profitable (Joly and Mangematin 1998, p. 80). The EC’s economic contribution could 
further decrease in special circumstances. For instance, the contractors that sequenced the left 
arm of chromosome XII were paid only 1.4 ECU/bp because the coordinator, Jörg Hoheisel, 
prepared plasmid sub-libraries to facilitate the work of the sequencing laboratories. This was 
again an attempt to improve the efficiency of the European network by assessing how the 
ordering of clones could speed up the work of the contractors that were warned “not to leave 
the clones sitting in the freezer while finishing off something else”.28 
To facilitate the growth of the contractor’s sequencing capabilities, the EC also offered 
opportunities to the participating laboratories to exchange ideas and learn from each other’s 
work. From 1989 until 1996, eight contractors’ meetings took place sponsored by the EC. In the 
meetings the participants discussed their practical experiences. Some complained that the lambda 
clones received from the DNA coordinator did not show the expected restriction pattern (e.g. 
Wilson et al. 1989), some presented results on the preliminary analysis of the sequence obtained 
(e.g. Cziepluch et al. 1994) and others discussed methodologies for the functional analysis of the 
yeast genome (Fey et al. 1995). The EC also sponsored training courses where necessary. For 
instance, P. Slonimski, in charge of the functional analysis, organised a practical course during 
the early stages of the pilot project. Course participants could bring their own ‘disruptants’ to 
study the function of a specific yeast gene and they could analyse them during the course 
(Goffeau and Vassarotti 1990, p. 30). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Letter from J. Hoheisel to the contractors of chromosome XI, 27 January 1995. E. J. Louis personal papers. 
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The yeast genome network implemented these strategies to reach the “critical threshold 
of human capacity, distributed among several laboratories” mentioned by Fasella in his 
interview.29 This ‘human capacity’ had a name and a surname, as remarked by the choice to 
publish the full list of the project participants in the Yeast Genome Directory, the overview of the 
entire genome sequence published as a supplement to the journal Nature (‘Yeast Genome 
Directory’ 1997). It is difficult, however, to define precisely what the EC’s civil servants had in 
mind when talking about capacity and capabilities in relation to the yeast genome project, and 
more generally, in relation to biotechnology strategies, because they never provide an explicit 
definition.30 This absence of a precise definition is not peculiar to the use of capacity building as 
an actors’ category in European biotechnology. Even used as an analytical category in 
contemporary policy discourse, capacity building lacks a clear definition and assumes a 
multiplicity of meanings (Harrow 2001). According to the current literature on capacity building, 
“the problem with capacity building as a concept, like community participation, human resources 
development and training, is that it is nothing more than a strategy somewhere in between an 
existing situation and a better one, between the formulation of an objective and achieving it.” 
(Mengers 2000, p. 378). Yet, even without a precise definition, it is somehow all there, in the 
image that capacity building suggests and that encompasses human resources development, 
networking skills and community construction, all elements that featured in the policy 
documents written by the EC’s civil servants involved in biotechnology. Addressing all these 
issues was a prerequisite for building the industrial capacity I am now going to examine. 
 
6. Building industrial capacity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Interview with Paolo Fasella (1998), Historical Archives of the European Union, Ref. INT585. 
30 Not even Mark Cantley, who was involved for many years in shaping European biotechnology policies and has 
been frequently interviewed (e.g. Jasanoff 2005) and written contributions on the topic (Cantley 1983, 1995; Cantley 
and de Nettancourt 1992), gives any definition of capacity and capabilities in this context. 
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“[W]ho says that progress in biotechnology doesn’t create employment?” (Cantley 1996). With 
this rhetorical question Mark Cantley closed the talk he gave at the Final European Conference 
of the Yeast Genome Sequencing Network. The talk had started comparing the ‘flagship’ 
genomic project on yeast to the sea voyages of the late fifteenth and sixteenth century. The 
findings of these voyages were celebrated as discovery, but the real motivations were political 
and commercial, reminded Cantley who knew only too well the ambitions that the EC harboured 
for its biotechnology strategy. These ambitions promoted the systematic involvement of 
industrial partners in the yeast genome project. Indeed, “the selection of the yeast genome 
sequencing projects as flagships of the [EC’s biotechnology] programmes was based on the fact 
that yeast was a model for many other industrially relevant genomes. It was considered less 
important that the research funded was primarily academic, than that the results would become 
available to all interested parties, and in particular to industry” (Senker 1998, p. 2). 
The yeast genome project pursued the creation of industrial partnerships in relation to 
both sequencing and exploitation of genomic data. The industrial laboratories of the brewing 
companies Carlsberg and La Cruz del Campo contributed to both sequencing and analysis of the 
genomic data. These laboratories shared the sequencing work with the other European 
contractors (Bojko et al. 1989; Navas et al. 1989), but they also had an interest in the functional 
analysis of the yeast genome (e.g. Ronnow and Kielland-Brandt 1993). Aside from these 
industrial laboratories that had a high degree of specialisation in yeast genetics, the other 
industrial contractors that took part in sequencing the yeast genome were biotechnology 
companies located in Belgium (1), France (1), Switzerland (1) and Germany (8) (Appendix A, in 
bold). These companies were “the experts on macro-sequencing and automatic equipment”, 
whose services the EC enrolled to enhance the efficiency of the sequencing networks it 
sponsored in the 1990s (Vassarotti et al. 1990, p. 87). The companies had the same contractual 
obligations of the other project participants in terms of payments, timely completion of the work 
and data quality, but, unlike the laboratories that specialised in yeast research, they were not 
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interested in functional analysis. On the other hand, they usually had more sequencing capability 
than the specialised laboratories, as almost all of them employed automatic techniques.31 The 
biotechnology companies that participated in sequencing the yeast genome were mainly based in 
Germany. These German companies were founded between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, 
the period in which the EC began to sponsor genomic projects.32 They were connected to 
academic settings: QIAGEN, for instance, was established by a team of scientists based at the 
Heinrich-Heine-Universität in Düsseldorf, Genotype GmbH was a spin-off of the German 
cancer centre DKFZ in Heidelberg, TIB MolBiol was again a spin-off of academic research 
founded by two PhD students, GATC was the company founded by the already mentioned Fritz 
Pohl, the Labor für DNA-Analytik was created by a researcher in Freiburg, and MediGene 
GmbH was a spin-off of the Munich Gene Centre. The EC contracts for sequencing the yeast 
genome helped these young companies to grow and expand their business, and favoured, at the 
same time, their continued connection to academic research, because the companies’ 
representatives attended the contractors’ meetings and had access to the confidential information 
exchanged during these events. 
Among the biotechnology companies that took part in the yeast genome project, GATC 
is of special interest. The company was set up in 1990 by Fritz Pohl (Universität Konstanz) in 
association with his three sons. GATC soon became “the most productive sequencing lab” in 
the European network (Oliver 1995, p. 392) and provided shotgun libraries also to several other 
contractors in the project. The company exploited the direct blotting electrophoresis method 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 See, for instance, the book of abstracts produced for the meeting of the European contractors held in Lisbon in 
June 1995 (European Commission 1995). For each contractor the sequencing methodology adopted is recorded. At 
that time the only biotechnology company that still adopted manual methods (standard dideoxy reactions) was 
Genotype GmbH. The other contractors relied on equipment produced by Applied Biosystems or EMBL. 
32 For instance, QIAGEN was founded in 1984, Genotype GmbH in 1987, TIB MolBiol in 1990, GATC in 1990, 
Labor für DNA-Analytik in 1993 and MediGene GmbH in 1994. 
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(and machinery) patented by Fritz Pohl and perfected by his son Thomas who managed GATC 
for many years. GATC provided a sequencing service, but it was not interested in yeast genetics 
per se.33 The expertise gained in the yeast genome project, however, allowed the company to take 
part also in other EC-sponsored sequencing projects (for instance, the one related to Arabidopsis 
thaliana). During its first decade of life GATC effectively grew thanks to these sequencing 
contracts and established itself on the biotech market, where it still competes.34 This company is 
an example of the dedicated biotechnology firms that the EC’s policymakers wanted to 
strengthen in Europe (Senker 1998). The sequencing projects, and in particular the yeast genome 
project, contributed to the achievement of this goal because they provided a steady income in 
critical stages of these companies’ development. However, the strategy was successful only to 
some extent, because the payment received for each base pair by the EC was enough to make 
profit, but not to invest in the development of new sequencing technology.35 
The EC’s effort to build industrial capacity in biotechnology was not limited to the direct 
involvement of industrial laboratories and biotechnology companies in the sequencing activities. 
This type of support, although helpful to specific companies, failed to address what was 
considered a major weakness in the European system, that is the scarce success in the systematic 
transformation of scientific discoveries into industrial applications (Senker 1998). Therefore, the 
EC tried to facilitate the exploitation of research results and improve academic-industrial 
collaboration by creating industrial platforms, such as YIP (Aguilar et al. 1998). YIP gathered 
together biochemical, agrofood and pharmaceutical industries interested in yeast (Table 2). In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Thomas Pohl was a skilled technician, not a research scientist. He did not have a university education, but training 
as professional assistant technician and started working at the EMBL, where he remained for six years before setting 
up the company with his father and brothers. 
34 In 2001 the EC stopped granting funding for pure sequencing projects and GATC had to find new markets to 
survive. 
35 Thomas Pohl, personal communication. 
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principle the platform’s members supported the EC’s R&D programmes “looking for possible 
applications of the sequencing knowledge to their own research and development projects” and 
sought “to contribute to regulatory, educational, and communication issues, in order to achieve a 
balanced image of the biotechnology industry” (Yeast Industry Platform n.d., p. 2). In practice, 
the companies paid an annual sum to cover the administrative costs of the consortium and to 
gain privileged access to the sequencing information produced by the yeast genome project. YIP 
companies were also facilitated in establishing collaborations with the sequencing laboratories, 
when the contractors uncovered yeast genes of potential interest (Goujon 2001, pp. 430–434). 
Despite the many expectations placed by the EC on YIP, at the end of the sequencing 
project the overall evaluation that the members gave of the consortium’s activity was negative, 
because YIP had failed its mission to improve significantly the “translation of results into 
products” (Wolf 1996). Relationships with the academic researchers involved in the project had 
not developed systematically.36 However, YIP members lobbied for and became involved in the 
EUROFAN projects (Aguilar et al. 1998; Goujon 2001, pp. 497–511). These projects were set 
up to perform a systematic functional analysis of the data produced in the yeast genome project 
and the YIP companies had privileged access to the information and could evaluate its potential 
for commercial exploitation (Dujon 1998). 
 The unsatisfactory outcome in building industrial capabilities was not peculiar to the 
yeast genome project, but considered a critical aspect in EC’s biotechnology strategies. The 
Community’s policymakers constantly flagged this issue (European Commission 1991, p. 15) and 
the European political establishment shared their concerns. For instance, Gordon Adam, a 
British MEP and a member of the Energy, Research and Technology Committee of the 
European Parliament, likened the EC’s investments in precompetitive research to building a new 
dam and wished to “let that water flow out of the dam into our industries” to achieve the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Oral history with Edward Louis (March 2017). 
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promised economic growth.37 No one, however, had an effective recipe about how to let the 
water flow. EC’s civil servants and policy advisors working for the Commission constantly 
stressed that Europe was falling behind United States and Asia in the commercialisation of 
biotechnology and solutions were needed to reverse the trend (Senker 1998). Several factors 
were at stake in producing this result: “Europe’s capabilities in developing linkages with the 
private sector”, access to finance, patenting and regulation of biotechnology inventions (Senker 
1998, p. 157; 162). All these elements had, besides economic value, ethical, social and 
environmental implications that made them highly debated topics in the European political 
scenario. EC’s civil servants felt that these debates constrained the development of 
biotechnology policies and the achievement of economic growth in comparison to the attitude 
adopted by the US and considered more permissive (Garon and Montpetit 2007). They feared 
that this could significantly hamper the developments of European biotechnology and threaten 
the capacity building exercise that they had tried to stimulate: 
We seem to be moving towards an international division of labour, in which Europe will 
have ethical debates, bioethical committees, parliamentary resolutions and technology-
specific regulations, and US (and Asia) will have patents, investment, employment and 
economic growth.38 
Yet, little could be done to avoid this situation because the economic development of 
European biotechnology was never dissociated from political and social choices, as 
discussed by Jasanoff (2005) and Gottweis (1998). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Talk entitled “Technology transfer and the exploitation of European Research and technological development”, 
Gordon Adam Papers, Historical Archives of the European Union, Ref. GA/35. 
38 Gordon Adam Papers, Historical Archives of the European Union, Ref. GA/33/2/i. 
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Table 2: YIP members in 1990 
Name Country Sector of activity 
Alko Ltd Finland Agrofood 
Boehringer Mannheim GmbH Germany Pharmaceutical 
Champagne Moët & Chandon France Agrofood 
Guinness Brewing Worldwide Ltd. United Kingdom Agrofood 
Interbrew N. V. Belgium Agrofood 
Kabi Pharmacia A.B. Sweden Pharmaceutical 
Lesaffre & Cie France Agrofood 
Nestec Ltd Switzerland Agrofood 
Orsan Eurolysine France Agrofood 
Pernod Ricard  France Agrofood 
Rhône Poulenc Rorer France Pharmaceutical 
Royal Gist-brocades The Netherlands Pharmaceutical 
Smith Kline Beecham Biologicals Belgium Pharmaceutical 
Tepral BSN France Agrofood 
Transgène France Biotech 
Unilever The Netherlands Agrofood/chemicals 
Data source: Yeast Industry Platform (n.d.). 
 
7. Conclusion: European biotechnology as a conundrum of science, politics and 
business 
The yeast genome project sponsored by the EC increased sequencing capabilities in academic 
laboratories and industrial settings and involved private companies in the use of the genomics 
information collected. Whilst this effort certainly strengthened academic science across the EEC 
and helped several small and recently founded biotechnology companies to establish themselves 
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in the sequencing business, it was not so successful in promoting the translation of genomic data 
into applications that food, pharmaceutical and biotech companies could exploit to improve 
their processes or commercialise new products. In this sense, the yeast genome project already 
exposed the problems in the translation of genomic data that became a major and recurrent 
concern in the life sciences (Sunder Rajan and Leonelli 2013). 
 By bringing together academic laboratories and private companies, basic science and 
industrial applications, the yeast genome project fulfilled the expectations of EC’s biotechnology 
policies. Even though ambitions had to be downsized in practice and only partial results were 
accomplished in industrial development, the political vision of transnational cooperation and 
economic growth that inspired the project was never refuted and EC’s civil servants had a direct 
and constant involvement in it. The EC even sponsored the publication of the Yeast Genome 
Directory that summarised the project’s results (‘Yeast Genome Directory’ 1997). However, 
influential sectors of the European biological community criticised the involvement of the EC in 
science policy, including its strategy for genome research. Lennart Philipson, then director of the 
European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), contested the peer review process established 
by the EC, accused the Commission of distributing “funds on geographical rather than scientific 
criteria” and of suffering from “an opaque, bureaucratic, time-consuming, costly and laborious 
administration” (Philipson 1991, p. 92). EMBL, indeed, had a very marginal involvement in the 
yeast genome project despite its commitment to collaborative research and scientific training 
(Morange 1997). 
Members of the scientific community, like Philipson, failed to realise that the EC’s 
strategy was by no means limited to scientific research, even though it was grounded on it. 
Promoting transnational research efforts was part of a political design to favour integration 
within the countries of the EEC and to build skills and industrial know-how in biotechnology, 
considered a key sector for economic and social development. Geographically distributed 
collaborations like the yeast genome project contributed to achieving this goal because they gave 
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an opportunity to join transnational networks to institutions based anywhere in the EEC. Even 
though these networks were dominated by the European countries that had greater expertise in 
biotechnology – France, Germany and Belgium for the yeast genome project –, they were 
nevertheless an opportunity to build capabilities also for the institutions based in the EEC 
nations where biotechnology research was still in its infancy. These transnational networks 
complemented the work of research institutions, like EMBL and CERN, that prided themselves 
on excellence in scientific research, but unavoidably remained multinational rather than 
transnational institutions and were located at the heart of the European scientific establishment, 
but could hardly reach its peripheries (Morange 1997; Krige 1996, 2002). 
If the foundation of EMBL in the 1970s coincided with a “move to a more complex 
level of social organization” in molecular biology and the opportunity to “strengthen Europe 
politically and economically” (Krige 2002, p. 563), even deeper were the changes that 
accompanied the developments of European biotechnology in the 1980s and 1990s. After the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, European political geography was constantly changing and the EC had to 
take this into account while drafting and implementing R&D strategies. Moreover, the 
management of European biotechnology was never only a scientists’ business. Politicians, 
bureaucrats, citizens, consumers, entrepreneurs, workers were all considered by the EC as 
relevant stakeholders in biotechnology. Therefore, political designs and industrial strategies, 
issues raised by citizens’ and consumers’ movements, concerns of labour forces and requests of 
professional groups had to be taken into account when biotechnology strategies were at stake. 
European biotechnology was a conundrum of science, politics and business because it 
was part of the active process of building a European shared identity within the countries of the 
EEC. Similarly to what the history of technology has done for specific artefacts, therefore it 
should be assessed as a set of “Europe-building practices” (Misa and Schot 2005, p. 9), in which 
scientific expertise was mobilised and knowledge networks and industrial innovation created as 
part of the European integration process. The proactive role of the EC was crucial in the yeast 
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genome project and the capacity building exercise the Commission stimulated can be regarded as 
an early example of these Europe-building practices. By investing in human resources 
development rather than in technological improvement and by establishing connections between 
academic research and industrial applications the EC was able to bring together in the yeast 
genome project the scientific, economic and political dimensions of its biotechnology policy, 
satisfying its ambitions as a political entrepreneur. The capabilities developed in the project 
remained for the EC’s civil servants something to be proud of, as evident in the opening 
quotation taken from Fasella’s interview, and a building block of the ambitious agenda that 
wanted to build European identity from day-to-day policies (Schipper and Schot 2011) rather 
than political treaties. 
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Appendix A: Institutions participating in the European Yeast Genome Network* 
Nation Institution(s) 
Belgium 
(Founding member) 
1. Université Libre de Bruxelles 
2. Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
3. CERIA-COOVI (Brussels) 
4. Université de Liège (Gembloux) 
5. Universiteit Gent 
6. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
7. Université Catholique de Louvain 
8. Innogenetics (Gent) 
 
Denmark 
(joined CEC in 
1973) 
1. Technical University of Denmark (Lyngby) 
2. Carlsberg Laboratory (Copenhagen) 
 
Finland 
(joined CEC in 
1995) 
University of Helsinki 
France 
(Founding member) 
1. Institut de Biochimie et Génétique Cellulaires CNRS (Bordeaux) 
2. Université de Bordeaux II 
3. Institut Curie (Orsay) 
4. Université de Paris-Sud (Orsay) 
5. Institut National Agronomique Paris-Grignon (Thiverval-Grignon) 
6. CNRS Recombinaisons Génétiques (Rennes) 
7. Institut Pasteur (Paris) 
8. École Normale Supérieure (ENS) (Paris) 
9. CNRS Institut de Botanique (Strasbourg) 
10. CNRS Centre de Génétique Moléculaire (Gif-sur-Yvette) 
11. Service de Biochimie CEN (Saclay) 
12. Pharmacia Biotech (Orsay) 
 
Germany 
(Founding member) 
1. Technische Universität Darmstadt 
2. Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen 
3. Georg-August- Universität Göttingen 
4. Technische Universität München 
5. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
6. Max-Planck-Institut für Biochemie (Martinsried) 
7. MIPS (Martinsried Institute for Protein Sequences) 
8. Universität Konstanz 
9. Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität (Frankfurt am Main) 
10. RWTH Aachen 
11. EMBL (European Molecular Biology Laboratory) (Heidelberg) 
12. DKFZ (Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum) (Heidelberg) 
13. Universität Bielefeld 
14. Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz 
15. Hans Knöll Institute (Jena) 
16. Heinrich-Heine-Universität (Düsseldorf) 
17. GB-Genome Analysis (Braunschweig) 
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18. AGON GmbH (Berlin) 
19. MediGene GmbH (Martinsried) 
20. TIB MolBiol (Berlin) 
21. GATC (Gesellschaft für Analyse Technik und Consulting) 
(Konstanz) 
22. QUIAGEN GmbH (Hilden) 
23. Genotype GmbH (Wilhelmsfeld) 
24. Labor für DNA-Analytik (Freiburg) 
 
Greece 
(joined CEC in 
1981) 
Foundation for Research and Technology-Hellas (Heraklion) 
 
Ireland 
(joined CEC in 
1973) 
Trinity College (Dublin) 
Italy 
(Founding member) 
1. Università di Milano 
2. Università di Padova 
3. Università di Roma La Sapienza 
4. Università di Roma Tor Vergata 
5. Università della Tuscia (Viterbo) 
6. ICGEB (Trieste) 
7. INCIB (Trieste) 
 
The Netherlands 
(Founding member) 
1. Universiteit Leiden 
2. Universiteit van Amsterdam 
3. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
4. TU Delft 
 
Portugal 
(joined CEC in 
1986) 
Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência (Oeiras Codex) 
Spain 
(joined CEC in 
1986) 
1. Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
2. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 
3. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
4. Universitat de València (Burjasot) 
5. Universidad de Salamanca 
6. Universidade da Coruña (A Coruña) 
7. Universitat de Lleida 
8. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
9. La Cruz del Campo S.A. (Sevilla) 
United Kingdom 
(joined CEC in 
1973) 
1. Manchester Biotechnology Centre (UMIST) 
2. AFRC Institute of Food Research (Norwich) 
3. Radcliffe Hospital (Oxford) 
4. University of Durham 
5. University of Aberdeen 
6. The Queens University of Belfast 
 
Sweden Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) (Stockholm) 
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(joined CEC in 
1995) 
Switzerland 
(EFTA member) 
1. Universität Basel 
2. Microsynth GmbH (Balgach) 
 
Norway 
(EFTA member) 
The Biotechnology Centre of Oslo 
Czech Republic 
(joined EU in 2004) 
Academy of Sciences (Prague) 
 
Poland 
(joined EU in 2004) 
Wroclaw University 
*The table was generated using the institutional affiliations listed in official publications of the yeast genome project 
(see ‘Yeast Genome Directory’ 1997, p. 9). Only universities or research institutions are listed, not the individual 
laboratories that took part in the Yeast Genome Sequencing Network. Companies are listed in bold type. 
 
